Rawalpindi (Web Desk): Chief of Army Staff (COAS) Field Marshal Syed Asim Munir has no intentions of stepping into a political role, particularly the presidency, according to a categorical denial issued by the military’s media wing.
Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) Director General, Lieutenant General Ahmed Sharif Chaudhry, in an interview with The Economist, rejected such speculation outright, calling it baseless and fabricated.
Describing the rumors as “nonsense,” the DG ISPR stated unequivocally that there is no truth to claims suggesting the army chief harbors political ambitions or is considering assuming the role of president.
He emphasized that “These claims are irresponsible and purely fictional. Dragging the military into politics is dangerous and misleading.” He further asserted that no such suggestion is being reviewed by the military establishment, and the COAS himself has shown no interest in the matter.
This official stance mirrors earlier remarks made by Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, who also refuted the idea.
Similarly, Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) Senator Irfan Siddiqui clarified that neither former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif nor the Pakistan PML-N had ever contemplated nominating Field Marshal Munir for the presidency.
Federal Interior Minister Mohsin Naqvi weighed in previously through a post on X, saying “there has been no discussion nor any proposal for the president to resign or the COAS to assume that office.” He pointed out that these narratives appear to be part of a deliberate campaign to malign senior figures in the state, including President Asif Ali Zardari.
In the same interview, General Ahmed Sharif also addressed growing tensions between Pakistan and India, issuing a clear warning that any military aggression from New Delhi would provoke a severe and potentially unconventional counteraction from Islamabad.
“This time we will start from the east,” he cautioned, indicating Pakistan's readiness to strike pre-emptively and penetrate deep into Indian territory. He stressed that “India needs to understand that they too can be targeted anywhere,” suggesting that future provocations could meet with comprehensive retaliation, and that Pakistan would no longer limit itself to a defensive posture.
Tensions between the two nuclear-armed neighbors reached alarming levels following the incident in Pahalgam on April 22, 2025. India blamed Pakistan for the attack without presenting any concrete evidence.
Following this, New Delhi suspended the decades-old Indus Waters Treaty, drastically downgraded diplomatic ties, stopped issuing visas to Pakistani nationals, and expelled those already receiving medical treatment in India.
Pakistan responded in kind by declaring the treaty’s suspension an act of war, scaling back India’s diplomatic presence, closing its airspace to Indian aircraft, and halting all bilateral trade.
The situation deteriorated further on the night of February 6–7, when Indian forces launched missile strikes on several Pakistani cities including Kotli, Bahawalpur, Muridke, Bagh, and Muzaffarabad. These attacks left 26 civilians dead and 46 injured.
Pakistan retaliated forcefully by shooting down six Indian military jets, including three advanced Rafale aircraft. A few days later, on February 10, India struck again—this time targeting Pakistani airbases.
In swift response, Pakistan initiated Operation Banyan Marsus (Iron Wall), which involved strikes on Indian military installations such as Udhampur, Pathankot, and Adampur airbases, along with high-value targets like BrahMos missile storage depots and S-400 missile defense systems.
A ceasefire was eventually arranged through diplomatic efforts, reportedly led by the Trump administration, although India has yet to formally acknowledge Washington’s role. Nonetheless, US President Donald Trump has made repeated public references—over 30 times—to his involvement in defusing the conflict, using it to highlight the seriousness of the crisis and the need for international mediation to prevent a wider war.